Apr 8, 2026

9 min read

Why are we so Slow to Adopt Fresh Ideas?

The “journey” of fresh ideas taken towards maturity in the human and natural sciences and why it may slow their adoption.

Why are we so Slow to Adopt Fresh Ideas? post cover image

An idea is a living thing. It has a birth and a growth and an adulthood and a death. These “newborn” ideas are not often faced with excitement but are often faced with a challenging journey towards maturity. Why is it that the “fresh,” bearing the potential for such impact, sometimes encounters resistance within the very areas of knowledge it seeks to enrich? In the rest of this essay, in conjunction with the areas of knowledge of natural sciences and human sciences, I will be discussing why this might be the case, focusing on paradigm shifts, lack of evidence, and presentation.

Natural Sciences

The first reason for the slow adoption of fresh ideas in the natural sciences may be paradigm shifts. According to Thomas Kuhn, the paradigm, which he initially applied to the natural sciences, “designates what the members of a certain scientific community have in common, that is to say, the whole of techniques, patents, and values shared by the members of the community” (Agamben 9:17). Therefore, challenging a paradigm, or shifting an existing paradigm, is to change its techniques, values, and definitions—the very foundations of it.

Resistance to adopting new ideas and knowledge can be attributed to their paradigm-shifting nature, as they completely reshape the dominant “way of seeing.” Since new paradigms may offer substantially different and complex ideas, the difficulty in understanding those ideas adds a layer of resistance, as it requires viewing through an unfamiliar lens, demanding a significant “cognitive shift.”

An instance of delayed acceptance of new ideas in the natural sciences due to the existing paradigm may be physicist Max Planck’s equation E=hν. In 1900, he found the “universal” equation for black-body radiation. However, at the same time, he found that energy could be quantized with packets. If classical physics were to be held true and the subsequent implications of Planck’s equation and findings were to be acknowledged, then the total energy of the system is predicted to be infinite (Kragh 63). Since an infinite amount of energy cannot exist, there was a conflict between classical physics (the existing paradigm of the time) and Planck’s findings. Furthermore, the renowned physicist Hendrik Lorentz did not prefer the “theoretically unsatisfactory” Planck’s equation and rather preferred the existing theory, which was the Rayleigh-Jeans-Lorentz formula (Kragh 63–64).

For the first decade of the twentieth century, Planck’s equation could not be reconciled with the existing paradigm since his theories demanded significant cognitive shifts from the widely accepted classical physics. Thus, the paradigm-shifting nature of Planck’s findings hindered their acceptance in the scientific community. It was only with Einstein’s subsequent work in the 1910s that Planck’s revolutionary work was accepted and allowed the birth of quantum mechanics (Kragh 66).

Another point of view is that the paradigm-shifting nature of a new idea might have different effects on its acceptance when the “maturity” of the area is considered, since if the field is novel, then new ideas may be accepted faster to improve the area quicker. An example of this is the area of genetic engineering and the CRISPR-Cas9 technology—which allows the editing of genes—found in 2012. Compared to the existing paradigm (zinc finger nucleases), CRISPR-Cas9 was profoundly precise and adaptable (Aljabali 1). Because of its transformative power, the knowledge was swiftly accepted, and the amount of research on its applications increased (Aljabali 2). The swift adoption of CRISPR-Cas9 is attributed to the novelty and immaturity of the genetic engineering field, showing that the rate at which fresh ideas are adopted may be dependent on the area’s maturity. It is crucial to acknowledge that the rapid adoption of gene editing must not overshadow the insufficient comprehension of its ethical implications. In areas such as genetic engineering that have the potential to alter human biology, a thorough understanding of ethical considerations is necessary.

The second reason for the slow adoption of fresh ideas in the natural sciences may be the lack of evidence. In the natural sciences, the demand for empirical evidence is fundamental, so new concepts or hypotheses may face reluctance from the scientific community if they lack robust evidence. This may lead to fresh ideas being slow to adopt because of a lack of—or unsatisfactory—evidence and observations.

This is exemplified by the theory of continental drift, which suggests that continents were once together and have since drifted apart. This was first put forward by Alfred Wegener in 1912. Despite Wegener presenting some evidence for his hypothesis, the prevailing consensus was that the evidence provided was insufficient and unsatisfactory. Additionally, Wegener faced challenges in articulating the underlying mechanism for continental drift adequately, leading to instances where he was “ridiculed” for his work (Oreskes 10).

His theory was rejected until 1950, when numerous discoveries—such as palaeomagnetism—provided strong support and explanation for continental drift, thereby providing a substantial basis for today’s model of plate tectonics. Since then, Wegener’s discoveries have been accepted as facts. This example highlights how the swift adoption of fresh ideas was impeded due to a lack of evidence and explanation, also illustrating the scientific community’s commitment to relying on evidence and observation before accepting new ideas.

Human Sciences

The first reason for the slow adoption of new ideas and knowledge in the human sciences may be paradigm shift. It has been said that the concept of paradigm shifts was conceived by Thomas Kuhn originally within the framework of the natural sciences. Still, the concept can be and has been applied to the human sciences. Scientists researching and refining existing theories might have a strong emotional attachment, and when a new paradigm emerges, challenging the very foundation of their work, an “emotional resistance” may be triggered by it. This may diminish the swift adoption of fresh ideas in the human sciences.

Psychologist Sigmund Freud’s work The Interpretation of Dreams exemplifies how new ideas with a paradigm-shifting nature may delay their adoption. Particularly, this work discusses the theory of dreams and the subconscious mind, which has led to the invention of psychoanalysis. At the heart of Freud’s theory lies the belief that dreams are the path to the unconscious, which can provide insights into repressed desires and conflicts of the human mind (Benjafield 11). In fact, a part of his theory posited that unacceptable sexual wishes were repressed into the unconscious. This exploration of dream analysis in his work challenged the prevailing psychological paradigms of the time. Especially the paradigm shift from a purely behaviourist perspective to an emphasis on the unconscious mind and the significance of symbolic dreams encountered significant resistance within the field, and in large part, behaviourism continued to have adherents (Benjafield 12). Critics questioned the subjectivity involved in dream interpretation, and for the most part, “schools [of psychology] tended to distance themselves from psychoanalysis” (Benjafield 11), with some going as far as to say that psychoanalysts were “witch doctors” and that psychoanalysis was pseudoscience (Feynman 114–115).

It can be said that Freud’s ideas were substantially different from the dominant paradigm and challenged the status quo deeply. Due to this, his ideas faced emotional resistance from the scientific community. Despite this initial scepticism, Freud’s concepts and ideas gradually gained acceptance in the field of psychology. This example underscores how the paradigm-shifting nature of new ideas can impede their rapid adoption within the human sciences.

The second reason for the slow adoption of fresh ideas in the human sciences may be the presentation and expression of such ideas. Since human sciences concern humans and human behaviour, in a sense, presentation takes up a huge part in the dissemination of ideas. While data and evidence are important, there might be bias and errors in reasoning, making the manner of exposition vital for understanding. Ideas that are poorly presented may lack clarity, making them difficult to understand. If the language is overly complex, convoluted, or unclear, it can create a barrier to comprehension, hindering its adoption. The emotional tone and impact of the presentation (if it is harsh or reproachful) can also influence its reception, as it may spark emotional reactions that cloud judgement and obscure the ideas themselves.

A prime example of this is one of anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’s works, The Savage Mind. The work is notoriously dense, with “intimidating terms” all over (Andreski 134). Lévi-Strauss’s theories combine baffling complexity with overwhelming scholarship, to the extent that readers of his work are “being treated to a confidence trick” (Leach 3). Moreover, Lévi-Strauss occasionally references mathematical concepts without providing clear explanations, adding to the work’s overall sense of obscurity (Andreski 85). The work’s overly complex and convoluted nature, along with its unconventional argumentation, contributed to a slower adoption of Lévi-Strauss’s ideas. This illustrates how the style and structure of his work played an important role in shaping its adoption among scholars and thinkers. In the end, though, this work was pivotal within structuralism and structural anthropology.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the “journey” of fresh ideas taken towards maturity in the human and natural sciences involves different factors that may slow their adoption. Paradigm shift, evident in Freud’s psychoanalysis and Planck’s equation, highlights the emotional resistance faced and the challenges of cognitive shifts in its slow adoption, though CRISPR-Cas9 and genetic engineering show the significance of the maturity of the area in its swift adoption. Claude Lévi-Strauss’s complex style in The Savage Mind exemplifies how presentation may influence an idea’s acceptance. Wegener’s theory of continental drift underscores the role of empirical evidence in the adoption of new ideas.

It is worth noting that the slow adoption of fresh ideas is important in the scientific process. Questioning empirical evidence and observation is vital, as is reluctance towards new paradigms and unconventional presentations in dissecting new knowledge. Also, these examples highlight the importance of critical thinking, patience, and open-mindedness in the face of new ideas and the significance of disputes and resistance in advancing scientific knowledge.

Bibliography

Agamben, Giorgio. “What is a Paradigm?” YouTube, uploaded by European Graduate School Video Lectures, 27 Mar. 2008, www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9Wxn1L9Er0.

Aljabali, Alaa A. A., et al. “Principles of CRISPR-Cas9 Technology: Advancements in Genome Editing and Emerging Trends in Drug Delivery.” Journal of Drug Delivery Science and Technology, vol. 92, Feb. 2024, p. 105338. ScienceDirect, doi.org/10.1016/j.jddst.2024.105338.

Andreski, Stanislav. Social Sciences as Sorcery. Deutsch, 1972.

Benjafield, John G. “Major Paradigms and Approaches in Psychology.” The Cambridge Handbook of the Intellectual History of Psychology. Ed. Robert J. Sternberg and Wade E. Pickren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 4–28. Print. Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology.

Feynman, Richard P. The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen Scientist. Perseus Books, 1998.

Kragh, Helge. Quantum Generations: A History of Physics in the Twentieth Century. Princeton University Press, 1999. JSTOR, doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv10crfmk. Accessed 10 Feb. 2024.

Leach, Edmund Ronald. Claude Lévi-Strauss. University of Chicago Press, 1989.

Oreskes, Naomi. The Rejection of Continental Drift: Theory and Method in American Earth Science. Oxford UP, 1999.


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